Patent Appeal No. 8345. April 29, 1971. Roy F. Schaeperklaus, Pearce Schaeperklaus, Cincinnati, Ohio, attorney of record for appellant. William A. Smith, Jr., Smith, Michael, Bradford Gardiner, Washington, D.C., James W. Pearce, Pearce Schaeperklaus, Cincinnati, Ohio, of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and McMANUS, Judge, Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation
Patent Appeal No. 9136. November 1, 1973. Sheldon W. Rothstein, Brown Mikulka, Cambridge, Mass., attorneys of record, for appellant; Donald R. Dunner, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Ellsworth H. Mosher, Arlington, Va., for amicus curiae. Joseph F. Nakanura, Acting Sol., for the Commissioner of Patents. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and ALMOND, Senior Judge. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This appeal is from the dismissal by the Board of
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
I.The legislature finds that there has been a proliferation of exploitation of children through their use as subjects in sexual performances. The care of children is a sacred trust and should not be abused by those who seek to profit through a commercial network based upon the exploitation of children. The public policy of the state demands the protection of children from exploitation through sexual performances. II.It is the purpose of this chapter to facilitate the prosecution of those who exploit
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)