Ex Parte Dennis et al

21 Cited authorities

  1. Phillips v. AWH Corp.

    415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 5,714 times   164 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "because extrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the district court in its sound discretion to admit and use such evidence"
  2. Liebel-Flarsheim Company v. Medrad, Inc.

    358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 1,299 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claim terms are given the full breadth of their ordinary meaning unless a clear disavowal of scope is stated in the specification
  3. In re Wands

    858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 333 times   41 Legal Analyses
    Holding that whether undue experimentation is required is a "conclusion reached by weighing many factual considerations. . . . includ[ing] the quantity of experimentation necessary, the amount of direction or guidance presented, the presence or absence of working examples, the nature of the invention, the state of the prior art, the relative skill of those in the art, the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and the breadth of the claims."
  4. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac

    344 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 207 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "dependent claims are presumed to be of narrower scope than the independent claims from which they depend"
  5. In re Am. Academy of Science Tech Ctr.

    367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 87 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that descriptions of deficiencies of using mainframe computers set out in the "Background of the Invention" portion of the specification did not exclude mainframes from the definition of "'user computer'" where the "specification as a whole" did not express a clear disavowal of that subject matter
  6. Intamin Ltd. v. Magnetar

    483 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 76 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding reverse engineering is not a blanket requirement of a reasonable pre-filing investigation
  7. In re Wright

    999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 90 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Relying on art published five years after filing date to show what was "sufficiently unpredictable" as of filing date
  8. In re Icon Health

    496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 46 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that "[a]nalogous art to Icon's application," which related to "a treadmill with a folding mechanism and a means for retaining that mechanism in the folded position," included "any area describing hinges, springs, latches, counterweights, or other similar mechanisms—such as the folding bed in" the prior art
  9. In re Vaeck

    947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 75 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding the examiner did not err in rejecting as nonenabled claims drawn to all genetically-engineered cyanobacteria expressing a given protein because the claimed 150 genera of cyanobacteria represent a vast, diverse, and poorly understood group; heterologous gene expression in cyanobacteria was "unpredictable"; and the patent's disclosure referred to only a genus
  10. In re Suitco Surface

    603 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 35 times   5 Legal Analyses
    In Suitco, we disagreed with the Board's broadest reasonable construction of the term "finishing the top surface of the floor," because the Board's construction "allow[ed] the finishing material to fall anywhere above the surface being finished regardless of whether it actually ‘finishes’ the surface."
  11. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,278 times   1023 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it
  12. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,056 times   447 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  13. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,938 times   944 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  14. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  15. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  16. Section 41.50 - Decisions and other actions by the Board

    37 C.F.R. § 41.50   Cited 34 times   30 Legal Analyses
    Requiring petitioners to raise the Board's failure to designate a new ground of rejection in a timely request for rehearing
  17. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)