§

Ex Parte Daghini et al

11920349 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 16, 2016)
Ex Parte Daghini et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. Shinseki v. Sanders

    556 U.S. 396 (2009)   Cited 4,495 times
    Holding that a "notice error" was harmless because the respondent "ha[d] not explained to the Veterans Court, to the Federal Circuit, or to us how the notice error to which he points could have made any difference"

  2. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,519 times   169 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  3. Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek

    567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 259 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the first prong was not met when “the record developed in the infringement proceeding ..., show[ed] that the question of equivalence was a close one,” particularly in light of the intensely factual inquiry involved in the doctrine of equivalents analysis

  4. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.

    464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 134 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding based on the record that "[t]he presence of certain secondary considerations of nonobviousness are insufficient as a matter of law to overcome our conclusion that the evidence only supports a legal conclusion that claim 1 would have been obvious"

  5. In re Fulton

    391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 76 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "a particular combination" need not "be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in order to provide motivation"

  6. In re Chapman

    595 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 11 times
    Remanding after correcting error in obviousness analysis

  7. In re Harris

    409 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that unexpected results require a difference in kind, not merely degree (citing In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1996))

  8. Application of Preda

    401 F.2d 825 (C.C.P.A. 1968)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 8016. October 24, 1968. Wenderoth, Lind Ponack, A. Ponak, Washington, D.C. (John T. Miller, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge and RICH, SMITH, ALMOND, and BALDWIN, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 7 and 8 of application serial No. 269,707

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,056 times   449 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)