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Ex Parte CUNNINGHAM et al

12626085 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 25, 2017)
Ex Parte CUNNINGHAM et al

14 Cited authorities

  1. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals

    339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 336 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding a claim invalid as anticipated when it claimed compounds in Markush form and a prior art reference disclosed one of the claimed compounds

  2. Continental Can Co. USA, v. Monsanto Co.

    948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 328 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an inherent limitation must be “necessarily present” and cannot be established by “probabilities or possibilities”

  3. In re Donohue

    766 F.2d 531 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 85 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a non-enabled disclosure will not suffice as § 102 prior art

  4. In re Oelrich

    666 F.2d 578 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 89 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Stating that "[t]he mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient" to establish inherency (quoting Hansgirg v. Kemmer , 102 F.2d 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939) )

  5. In re Morsa

    713 F.3d 104 (Fed. Cir. 2013)   Cited 25 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Affirming obviousness rejection of patent claims over single prior art press release

  6. Abbott Laboratories v. Baxter Pharmaceutical

    471 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 19 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Ruling that district court did not have to provide “numerical exactitude” on construction of disputed claim term where any added precision was not necessary to resolve the invalidity question

  7. Application of Swinehart

    439 F.2d 210 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 42 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the term "transparent" was definite because the disclosure, which showed that a substantial amount of infrared radiation was always transmitted even though the precise degree of transparency varied depending on certain factors, was sufficiently clear

  8. Application of Samour

    571 F.2d 559 (C.C.P.A. 1978)   Cited 26 times
    Noting the rule in the § 103 context and declining to extend that rule to § 102(b) rejections

  9. In re Kalm

    378 F.2d 959 (C.C.P.A. 1967)   Cited 16 times
    Reversing anticipation rejection

  10. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,061 times   459 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  11. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,942 times   958 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)