Appeal No. 77-532. January 12, 1978. As Amended January 18, 1978. James L. Bailey, Houston, Tex., attorney of record, for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. LANE, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board) affirming the final
FEBRUARY TERM, 1807. E. Tilghman, for appellant. No delay can be imputed to the appellant. There was no limitation by law. The federal court of appeals was unpopular in those states who were attached to the trial by jury, and its jurisdiction was opposed with great warmth. He cited the case of the sloop Active, and Mr. Olmstead's case, and an act of the legislature of Pennsylvania in support of that assertion. The jurisdiction of that court was not finally settled, until the case of Doane Penhallow
AUGUST TERM, 1799. IN error from the Circuit Court for the district of South-Carolina. A rule had been obtained by Lee, the attorney-general, at the opening of the Court, that the plaintiffs appear and prosecute their writ of error within the term, or suffer a non-pros.: but it was found, that errors had been assigned in the Court below, and a joinder in error entered here. The rule was, therefore, changed to the following: "that unless the plaintiffs in error appear and argue the errors to-morrow
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)