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Ex parte COWAN

15 Cited authorities

  1. In re Warmerdam

    33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 20 times
    Holding unpatentable a process for controlling objects to avoid collisions which described “nothing more than the manipulation of basic mathematical constructs, the paradigmatic ‘abstract idea’ ”

  2. Application of Moore

    439 F.2d 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 46 times
    Noting that the question is whether the scope of enablement conveyed by the disclosure to a person of ordinary skill in the art is commensurate with the scope of protection taught by the claims

  3. Application of Swinehart

    439 F.2d 210 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 42 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the term "transparent" was definite because the disclosure, which showed that a substantial amount of infrared radiation was always transmitted even though the precise degree of transparency varied depending on certain factors, was sufficiently clear

  4. Application of Brown

    459 F.2d 531 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 18 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8621. May 18, 1972. William C. Long, David Dick, New York City, attorneys of record, for appellants. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and RAO, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's

  5. Application of Deters

    515 F.2d 1152 (C.C.P.A. 1975)   Cited 7 times
    Rejecting patent expert testimony on nonobviousness where patent expert was not a person ordinarily skilled in the art and thus his opinion was "not evidence entitled to any weight in resolving the issue"

  6. In re Hallman

    655 F.2d 212 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 1 times

    Appeal No. 81-524. July 16, 1981. Harry V. Strampel, Wallenstein, Spangenberg, Hattis Strampel, Sidney W. Russell, Arlington, Va., for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., for Board of Appeals. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals ("board") sustaining the Examiner's rejection

  7. Application of Steppan

    394 F.2d 1013 (C.C.P.A. 1967)   Cited 7 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7831. December 28, 1967. James E. Bryan, Washington, D.C., for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and Judges RICH, SMITH, ALMOND, and KIRKPATRICK. Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. SMITH, Judge. The principal issues for decision are: (1) whether the compounds defined in appealed claims 17 through 22 would have been

  8. Application of Wilson

    424 F.2d 1382 (C.C.P.A. 1970)   Cited 3 times
    Noting that the court cannot ignore the specific language in a claim

  9. Application of Mindick

    371 F.2d 892 (C.C.P.A. 1967)   Cited 3 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7731. February 9, 1967. Herbert B. Keil, Richard L. Johnston, Chicago, Ill., for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. Senior District Judge, Eastern district of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. ALMOND, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 13 and 14 of application

  10. Application of Steele

    305 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1962)   Cited 2 times

    Patent Appeal No. 6719. July 25, 1962. J. Hart Evans, Louis C. Smith, Jr., New York City, and Paul A. Rose, Washington D.C., for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge O'CONNELL, pursuant to provisions

  11. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,362 times   1046 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  12. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.181 - Petition to the Director

    37 C.F.R. § 1.181   Cited 52 times   17 Legal Analyses
    Allowing for petitions invoking the Director's supervisory authority

  15. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)