§

Ex Parte Chuter et al

13286407 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2017)
Ex Parte Chuter et al

15 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,575 times   189 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc.

    48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 582 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a district court did not clearly err in finding materiality where the prior art reference at issue had been considered material by examiners in related foreign patent applications

  3. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group International, Inc.

    222 F.3d 951 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 212 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the public is entitled to rely on the patentee's representations in the prosecution history concerning the scope and meaning of the claims

  4. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 149 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight

  5. In re Robertson

    169 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 65 times
    Holding that inherent anticipation requires more than mere probability or possibility that the missing descriptive materials are present in the prior art

  6. In re Spada

    911 F.2d 705 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 58 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the claims were properly rejected by the PTO because they were anticipated by a prior art reference

  7. In re Bell

    991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 32 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 92-1375. April 20, 1993. Robert P. Blackburn, Chiron Corp., Emeryville, CA, argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Debra A. Shetka and Thomas E. Ciotti, Morrison Foerster, Palo Alto, CA, and Donald S. Chisum, Morrison Foerster, Seattle, WA. Teddy S. Gron, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Of counsel were John W. Dewhirst, Lee E. Barrett, Richard E. Schafer and Albin F. Drost. Appeal from the Patent

  8. In re Chaganti

    554 F. App'x 917 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   1 Legal Analyses

    2013-1372 01-27-2014 IN RE NAREN CHAGANTI NAREN CHAGANTI, of Town & Country, Missouri, pro se. NATHAN K. KELLEY, Deputy Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia. With him on the brief were JOSEPH MATAL and ROBERT J. MCMANUS, Associate Solicitors. PER CURIAM NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Serial No. 09/634,725. NAREN CHAGANTI, of Town & Country, Missouri, pro

  9. Application of Best

    562 F.2d 1252 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 18 times   4 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark

  10. Application of Burckel

    592 F.2d 1175 (C.C.P.A. 1979)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 78-616. March 1, 1979. C. Wayne Stephens, Wilmington, Del., for appellant; Hoge T. Sutherland, Los Angeles, Cal., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents; Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board) affirming

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,033 times   1028 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  13. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  14. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  15. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)