§

Ex Parte Cheng et al

13361800 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 31, 2016)
Ex Parte Cheng et al

17 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Leapfrog v. Fisher-Price

    485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 90 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the objective considerations of nonobviousness presented, including substantial evidence of commercial success, praise, and long-felt need, were inadequate to overcome a strong showing of primary considerations that rendered the claims at issue invalid

  3. Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese & Powder Sys., Inc.

    725 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013)   Cited 53 times
    Affirming district court's striking in part of an expert declaration that included untimely disclosures

  4. In re Icon Health

    496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 46 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that "[a]nalogous art to Icon's application," which related to "a treadmill with a folding mechanism and a means for retaining that mechanism in the folded position," included "any area describing hinges, springs, latches, counterweights, or other similar mechanisms—such as the folding bed in" the prior art

  5. In re Geisler

    116 F.3d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 52 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding a 26 percent improvement in wear resistance insufficient to constitute proof of "substantially improved results"

  6. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness

  7. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant

  8. Hyatt v. Dudas

    492 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 22 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Upholding the patent examiner's initial rejection in which the examiner found failure to satisfy the written description requirement because “the written description did not support the particular claimed combination of elements”— i.e., “while each element may be individually described in the specification, the deficiency was the lack of adequate description of their combination ”

  9. In re De Blauwe

    736 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 49 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 84-513. June 8, 1984. Jeffrey G. Sheldon, Pasadena, Cal., argued for appellants. John F. Pitrelli, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before BENNETT, Circuit Judge, SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLER, Circuit Judge. JACK R. MILLER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from that part of the decision of the

  10. Chester v. Miller

    906 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 19 times   2 Legal Analyses

    No. 90-1039. June 29, 1990. Marina V. Schneller, Mobil Oil Corp., Fairfax, Va., argued, for appellants. With her on the brief, was Alexander J. McKillop. Thomas G. De Jonghe, Chevron Corp., San Francisco, Cal., argued, for appellees. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Before MICHEL, Circuit Judge, BALDWIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WILL, Senior District Judge. The Honorable Hubert L. Will, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 132 - Notice of rejection; reexamination

    35 U.S.C. § 132   Cited 309 times   47 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting addition of "new matter"

  13. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  14. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  15. Section 41.50 - Decisions and other actions by the Board

    37 C.F.R. § 41.50   Cited 34 times   30 Legal Analyses
    Requiring petitioners to raise the Board's failure to designate a new ground of rejection in a timely request for rehearing

  16. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  17. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)