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Ex Parte Chan

14 Cited authorities

  1. Wied v. Valhi, Inc.

    465 U.S. 1026 (1984)   Cited 260 times
    Stating that "[t]o demand a slavish adherence to the procedural sequence and to require these defendants, in this case, to articulate the words of renewal once the motion had been taken under advisement, would be 'to succumb to a nominalism and a rigid trial scenario as equally at variance as ambush with the spirit of the rules.'"

  2. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc.

    157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 385 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "jury instruction on patent misuse" was overbroad, where it "focused primarily on the charge that [the patent holder] was attempting to enforce the patents against goods known not to be infringing"

  3. In re Rouffet

    149 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 160 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that objective evidence of nonobviousness [secondary considerations] "includes copying, long felt but unsolved need, failure of others, commercial success, unexpected results created by the claimed invention, unexpected properties of the claimed invention, licenses showing industry respect for the invention, and skepticism of skilled artisans before the invention"

  4. Pro-Mold Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics

    75 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 155 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, though we do not have exclusive jurisdiction over unfair competition claims, our own circuit law nonetheless determines when inequitable conduct also constitutes unfair competition

  5. In re Kotzab

    217 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 120 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that for a patent to be obvious, "there must be some motivation, suggestion or teaching of the desirability of making the specific combination that was made by the applicant."

  6. In re Sang-Su Lee

    277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 106 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that agency tribunals "must make findings of relevant facts, and present its reasoning in sufficient detail that the court may conduct meaningful review of the agency action"

  7. Verdegaal Bros., v. Union Oil Co. of Calif

    814 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 138 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding reliance on non-claimed distinction between prior art method and claimed method "inappropriate" and insufficient to save the claim from inherent anticipation

  8. In re Dembiczak

    175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 93 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Refusing to consider an obviousness rejection raised for the first time on appeal from the PTO

  9. Para-Ordnance Manufacturing, Inc. v. SGS Importers International, Inc.

    73 F.3d 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 81 times
    Explaining that "[f]rom the decision of the district court, we can, and do, accept the implicit fact-finding"

  10. Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.

    713 F.2d 760 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 111 times
    In Kalman, this court determined that the district court's fact finding of identity of invention (reached after a four day bench trial) was not clearly erroneous, and that "the stipulation by the parties, coupled with [Kimberly Clark's] failure to counter Kalman's affidavits and evidence submitted in his motion for summary judgment" dictated a finding of infringement.

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,174 times   493 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,034 times   1029 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  13. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)