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Ex Parte Celik

13 Cited authorities

  1. In re Hiniker Co.

    150 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 180 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Upholding rejection for obviousness even though prior art performed less efficiently than patent's device because it refused to read specification's operational characteristics into broader claims

  2. In re Sang-Su Lee

    277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 106 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that agency tribunals "must make findings of relevant facts, and present its reasoning in sufficient detail that the court may conduct meaningful review of the agency action"

  3. In re Dembiczak

    175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 93 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Refusing to consider an obviousness rejection raised for the first time on appeal from the PTO

  4. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"

  5. In re Fritch

    972 F.2d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 32 times
    Stating "dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious"

  6. McElmurry v. Arkansas Power Light Co.

    995 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 29 times
    In McElmurry, Arkansas Power & Light ("AP&L") used the invention in question only in its own facilities, even though a third-party contractor, upon receipt of the design and specifications for the invention from AP&L, had manufactured and installed the invention.

  7. In re Dance

    160 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 19 times

    No. 97-1229. October 30, 1998. Grady J. Frenchick, Stroud, Stroud, Willink Thompson Howard, Madison, Wisconsin, argued for appellants Dance, et al. of counsel on the brief was Karen B. King. David J. Ball, Jr., Associate Solicitor, Office of Solicitor, Arlington, Virginia, argued for appellee, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. With him on the brief were Nancy J. Linck, Solicitor, Albin F. Drost, Deputy Solicitor, and Scott A. Chambers, Associate Solicitor. Before MAYER, Chief Judge, NEWMAN

  8. In re Berger

    279 F.3d 975 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 15 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Declining to consider the merits of indefiniteness rejections not contested before the Board

  9. In re Gordon

    733 F.2d 900 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 31 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding that a modification which renders the invention inoperable for its intended purpose is not obvious because it teaches away from the invention

  10. Application of Sichert

    566 F.2d 1154 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 9 times

    No. 77-546. Argued October 7, 1977. Decided December 15, 1977. Blythe D. Watts, Cleveland, Ohio, for appellant; James G. Watterson, Chagrin Falls, Ohio, of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,174 times   493 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 1.192-1.196 - Reserved

    37 C.F.R. § 1.192-1.196   Cited 20 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Requiring "a statement . . . that the claims of the group do not stand or fall together," and an explanation "why the claims of the group are believed to be separately patentable"

  13. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)