Ex parte CARLE et al.

11 Cited authorities

  1. Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Company

    122 F.3d 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 194 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that “we must consider all of the evidence under the Graham factors before reaching our decision”
  2. In re Soni

    54 F.3d 746 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 91 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding "substantially improved results" to overcome obviousness when the 50-fold improvement in tensile strength was much greater than would have been predicted
  3. In re Woodruff

    919 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 58 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding a claimed invention obvious because claimed range (“more than 5% to about 25%” carbon monoxide) abutted range of prior art (“about 1–5%” carbon monoxide)
  4. In re Zletz

    893 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 42 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims failing this test during prosecution must be rejected under § 112, ¶ 2
  5. Application of Arkley

    455 F.2d 586 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 44 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting that an anticipating reference "must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed compound or direct those skilled in the art to the compound without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference"
  6. In re Sneed

    710 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 21 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Rejecting argument that a prior art reference should not be considered "because it deals with collapsible hose rather than flexible plastic pipe and teaches that rolling 600 feet of 4 inch, noncollapsible hose into a transportable bundle is virtually 'an insurmountable task'" because "it is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review."
  7. Application of Best

    562 F.2d 1252 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 18 times   4 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,133 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  9. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,004 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  10. Section 1.132 - Affidavits or declarations traversing rejections or objections

    37 C.F.R. § 1.132   Cited 104 times   14 Legal Analyses

    When any claim of an application or a patent under reexamination is rejected or objected to, any evidence submitted to traverse the rejection or objection on a basis not otherwise provided for must be by way of an oath or declaration under this section. 37 C.F.R. §1.132 65 FR 57057 , Sept. 20, 2000 Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations. Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations. Part 7 is placed in the

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)