No. 2011–1465. Reexamination Nos. 90/007,839 90/007,936 90/007,942 90/007,957 90/009,261. 2012-07-27 In re ANTOR MEDIA CORPORATION. Thomas A. Lewry, Brooks Kushman, P.C., of Southfield, Michigan, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Thomas W. Cunningham. William Lamarca, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia. With him on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Robert J. McManus, Associate Solicitor. LOURIE

Patent Appeal No. 8582. March 9, 1972. Charles W. B. Connors, Chicago, Ill. (Johnston, Root, O'Keeffe, Keil, Thompson Shurtleff, Chicago, Ill.), attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., son Shurtleff), Chicago, Ill., attorneys E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals

Patent Appeal No. 5440. May 4, 1948. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office, Serial No. 433,766. Proceedings in the matter of the application of Ernest G. Walters for a patent. From a decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming a decision of Primary Examiner rejecting certain claims of the application, the applicant appeals. Affirmed. Harry C. Duft and Cecil B. Hamilton, both of Washington, D.C., for appellant. W.W. Cochran, of Washington

(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)