Ex Parte Brinkman et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 15, 201713340225 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 15, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/340,225 12/29/2011 Henk-Jan Brinkman 509005 5061 53609 7590 01/26/2018 REINHART BOERNER VAN DEUREN P.C. 2215 PERRYGREEN WAY ROCKFORD, IL 61107 EXAMINER SU, XIAO WEI ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1733 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/26/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): RockMail@reinhartlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte HENK-JAN BRINKMAN, THOMAS WIRTZ, DIETMAR SCHRODER, EIKE BRUNGER, and KAI-FRIEDRICH KARHAUSEN Appeal 2017-004234 Application 13/340,225 Technology Center 1700 Before ROMULO H. DELMENDO, KAREN M. HASTINGS, and JAMES C. HOUSEL, Administrative Patent Judges. PER CURIAM. DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING This is in response to a Request for Rehearing (“Request”), dated January 5, 2018, of our Decision, mailed November 17, 2017 (“Decision”). In that Decision, we affirmed the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 1,3, 4, 17—19, 23, and 24 over Lorentzen et al. (US 2004/0011438 Al, published Jan. 22, 2004) (“Lorentzen”), as evidenced by Matweb1, in view of Murtha (US 5,919,323, issued July 6, 1999), Sano et al. (US 2007/0151635 Al, 1 Matweb, 6016 Aluminum Composition Spec, http://www.matweb.com/ search/Data.Sheet.aspx?MatGUID=f6ed02219a874e868afa00abf4967314 (last visited Apr. 16, 2015) (“Matweb”). Appeal 2017-004234 Application 13/340,225 published July 5, 2007) (“Sano”), and Oleksiak (US 6,060,438, issued May 9, 2000) and reversed the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 6 and 21 over the same references. We have reconsidered our Decision in light of Appellants’ comments in the Request and we find no error in the disposition of the § 103 rejection of claims 1,3,4, 17—19, 23, and 24. In the Request, Appellants argue “the Board has misapprehended the consequences of modifying Lorentzen from a continuous process to a batch process as disclosed in Murtha” (Request 2). Specifically, Appellants assert it would not have been obvious to modify the continuous process of Lorentzen to homogenize coiled strip in a batch process because it “is technically impracticable in view of the high temperatures [for homogenization]” and because using the homogenization process of Murtha to homogenize strip would involve “an extremely long and technically as well as economically unfeasible oven” to heat strip that is “up to several hundred feet long” (id. at 2—3). While we appreciate Appellants’ arguments, they are nonetheless unpersuasive. Appellants do not cite any evidence or persuasive technical reasoning that modifying Lorentzen in view of Murtha would have been “technically impracticable” except to assert that homogenization involves “high temperatures” (id. at 2) and homogenizing strip would require an “unfeasible oven” to heat “strip of up to several hundred feet long” (Appellants appear to mean uncoiled strip when referencing “strip of up to several hundred feet long”) (id. at 3). Thus, Appellants’ assertions regarding technical unfeasibility amount to mere attorney argument and, in any event, appear to arise to the modification of Lorentzen being technically difficult, 2 Appeal 2017-004234 Application 13/340,225 which is not demonstrative of non-obviousness (i.e., that the modified prior art would be inoperative or would not work) in the absence of supporting evidence or specific explanation that identifies a reversible error with sufficient particularity. As stated by Appellants, “the proper frame of reference for an obviousness rejection is the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art” {id. at 3). Moreover, “the test for combining references is not what the individual references themselves suggest but rather what the combination of disclosures taken as a whole would suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Here, the applied prior art provides evidence of obviousness. As explained in the Decision, Murtha discloses it was known to continuously cast an aluminum alloy, homogenize the cast ingot, and then roll the ingot in separate processes (Murtha 5:47—61). Murtha discloses that homogenization improves the homogeneity of solute and refines recrystallized grains for a final product {id. at 5:49-52). Thus, the disclosure of Murtha demonstrates it was known to process an aluminum alloy in separate processes and provides reasons to include a homogenization process. In view of an absence of evidence or persuasive technical reasoning to support Appellants’ position, a preponderance of the evidence in the record, including the disclosures of Lorentzen and Murtha, supports a conclusion that it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the process of Lorentzen so it uses batch processing and includes homogenization for strip, whether coiled or uncoiled, to improve solute homogeneity and to refine recrystallized grains in its final product, as disclosed by Murtha. 3 Appeal 2017-004234 Application 13/340,225 As noted above, Appellants contend modifying Lorentzen to include homogenization would be “economically unfeasible” (Request 2). Appellants further argue that Lorentzen’s disclosure “dissuades from adopting a batch process, such as the high operating expenses and capital equipment costs,” citing paragraph 11 of Lorentzen {id. at 4) These arguments are also unpersuasive. As discussed in the Decision, simply making a process more costly does not render a process unsatisfactory for its intended purpose when the process is otherwise functional to achieve its purpose (i.e., produce rolled solution heat treated aluminum strip in the case of Lorentzen’s process). Moreover, to the extent Appellants assert Lorentzen teaches away from the inclusion of Murtha’s homogenization process because it would incur additional cost, we note that something that is known or obvious does not become patentable simply because it has been described as somewhat inferior to some other product for the same use. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“additional expense associated with the addition of inhibitors would not discourage one of ordinary skill in the art”). Lorentzen recognizes that conventional processes, which are functional to produce solution heat treated aluminum alloy, are less desirable because they are more costly {see, e.g., Lorentzen 111). However, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that modifying the process of Lorentzen to include the homogenization process of Murtha would provide the benefits of improved solute homogeneity and refined grains in a final product, as taught by Murtha. One of ordinary skill in the art may be motivated to pursue the desirable properties taught by one reference, even if 4 Appeal 2017-004234 Application 13/340,225 that means foregoing the benefit taught by another reference. In re Urbanski, 809 F.3d 1237, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Winner Int 7 Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.”). Appellants’ arguments do not identify a reversible error in such an analysis. Appellants contend that “common sense” would dictate that one of ordinary skill in the art would have selected either Lorentzen’s or Murtha’s process, not a combination of the two (Request 3 4) and that although Murtha formed prior art for Lorentzen’s disclosure, “Lorentzen still emphasizes the benefit of cost saving by skipping a homogenization step and adopting a continuous, [micro]-mill process” (id at 4—5). These arguments ignore the disclosure of Murtha, including its disclosed benefits for homogenization (Murtha 5:49-52) and what this would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art, as discussed above. Therefore, one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to modify the process of Lorentzen to include the homogenization process of Murtha because they would have understood the homogenization process would provide the additional benefits disclosed by Murtha, even though it could incur additional cost. See Orthopedic Equipment Co., Inc. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“the fact that the two disclosed apparatus would not be combined by businessmen for economic reasons is not the same as saying that it could not be done because skilled persons in the art felt that there was some technological incompatibility that prevented 5 Appeal 2017-004234 Application 13/340,225 their combination. Only the latter fact is telling on the issue of nonobviousness.”). Appellants contend there has been no weighing of benefits in making a conclusion of obviousness but the Examiner and the Board has “only speculated that perhaps a person having ordinary skill in the art may desire the benefits of improving homogeneity and refining the recrystallized grains,” especially when “Lorentzen already discloses that the cast strip ‘typically has a temperature of from about 700 to about 1100° F,’ which ‘is generally above the solvus’” so there is “no need for homogenization,” and Lorentzen, thus, recognizes the properties Murtha discloses for its homogenization process (Request 4). However, Lorentzen does not disclose the time period at which the cast strip remains at the temperature disclosed by Lorentzen, such as a time period falling within the range disclosed by Murtha for its homogenization process (Murtha 2:61—62), and Lorentzen does not disclose or suggest that its process would otherwise provide the benefits of homogenization disclosed by Murtha. In addition, Appellants argue that the “Board may come to the conclusion that Lorentzen could be further modified to cast a rolling ingot instead of a strip” but that such a modification would not have been obvious because an ingot “in reality is much shorter in length and much greater in thickness” and the rolling mills of Lorentzen are impractical or incapable of hot rolling such an ingot (Request 3). This argument is unpersuasive. Lorentzen discloses casting strip and subsequently hot rolling the strip (Lorentzen 112). It would have been obvious to divide Lorentzen’s casting and hot rolling operation into separate processes in view of Murtha’s disclosure of using batch processing. Thus, there is no need to modify 6 Appeal 2017-004234 Application 13/340,225 Lorentzen’s casting process to produce an ingot. There is no evidence in the record that Lorentzen’s rolling process would not have been capable of rolling the strip produced by its casting process. Nor is there any evidence or persuasive technical reasoning in the record that Murtha’s homogenization process would be inapplicable to the cast strip of Lorentzen or that Murtha’s homogenization process would not provide the homogeneity and recrystallization refinement benefits disclosed by Murtha for Lorentzen’s material. Accordingly, no persuasive merit is present in Appellants’ argument that our Decision “misapprehended the consequences of modifying Lorentzen from a continuous process to a batch process as disclosed in Murtha” (Request 2). Thus, we decline to modify our decision to affirm the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of appealed claims 1,3,4, 17—19, 23, and 24 and reverse the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 6 and 21. In conclusion, based on the foregoing, Appellants’ Request is granted to the extent that we have reconsidered our Decision, but is denied with respect to making changes to the final disposition of the rejections therein. This Decision on the Request for Rehearing incorporates our Decision, mailed November 17, 2017, and is final for the purposes of judicial review. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.52 (a)(1). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(v). DENIED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation