Ex Parte Breuer et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,523 times   180 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek

    567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 259 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the first prong was not met when “the record developed in the infringement proceeding ..., show[ed] that the question of equivalence was a close one,” particularly in light of the intensely factual inquiry involved in the doctrine of equivalents analysis
  3. W.L. Gore Associates, Inc. v. Garlock

    721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 324 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court erred by "considering the references in less than their entireties, i.e., in disregarding disclosures in the references that diverge from and teach away from the invention at hand"
  4. In re Gurley

    27 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 100 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Upholding obviousness finding where patent was directed to one of two alternative resins disclosed in prior art reference, even though reference described claimed resin as "inferior."
  5. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness
  6. In re Gorman

    933 F.2d 982 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 42 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 90-1362. May 13, 1991. Thomas W. Tolpin, Highland Park, Ill., argued for appellant. Teddy S. Gron, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before RICH, NEWMAN, and RADER, Circuit Judges. PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey B. Gorman and Marilyn Katz (hereinafter "Gorman") appeal the decision of the United States

  7. In re Sneed

    710 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 21 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Rejecting argument that a prior art reference should not be considered "because it deals with collapsible hose rather than flexible plastic pipe and teaches that rolling 600 feet of 4 inch, noncollapsible hose into a transportable bundle is virtually 'an insurmountable task'" because "it is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review."
  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,066 times   464 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 183 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)