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Ex Parte Boyd et al

13634587 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 5, 2019)
Ex Parte Boyd et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. In re Kubin

    561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 133 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Finding patent invalid where an inherent benefit "is not an additional requirement imposed by the claims . . . but rather a property necessarily present" when the other limitations are satisfied

  2. Randall Mfg. v. Rea

    733 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013)   Cited 83 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Reversing finding of non-obviousness where court “narrowly focus[ed] on the four prior-art references” and ignored record evidence of “the knowledge and perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art” to explain motivation to combine or modify references

  3. In re O'Farrell

    853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 167 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Finding patent obvious where the prior art provided a "reasonable expectation of success"

  4. In re Huang

    100 F.3d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 94 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the inventor's opinion as to the purchaser's reason for buying the product is insufficient to demonstrate a nexus

  5. In re Geisler

    116 F.3d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 52 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding a 26 percent improvement in wear resistance insufficient to constitute proof of "substantially improved results"

  6. In re De Blauwe

    736 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 49 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 84-513. June 8, 1984. Jeffrey G. Sheldon, Pasadena, Cal., argued for appellants. John F. Pitrelli, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before BENNETT, Circuit Judge, SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLER, Circuit Judge. JACK R. MILLER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from that part of the decision of the

  7. Application of Lamberti

    545 F.2d 747 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 16 times

    Patent Appeal No. 76-610. December 9, 1976. Kenneth F. Dusyn, atty. of record, for appellants; Melvin H. Kurtz and M. Ted Raptes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board

  8. Application of McLaughlin

    443 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 11 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8474. June 24, 1971. Norman Lettvin, Chicago, Ill., attorney of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; R.V. Lupo, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and RE, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. BALDWIN, Judge. McLaughlin has appealed from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals sustaining the rejection of claims 13, 14 and 15 in his application as unpatentable

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)