Ex Parte Behm et al

13 Cited authorities

  1. Halliburton Energy v. M-I LLC

    514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 456 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a claim is "indefinite if a [claim] term does not have proper antecedent basis"
  2. Continental Can Co. USA, v. Monsanto Co.

    948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 334 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an inherent limitation must be “necessarily present” and cannot be established by “probabilities or possibilities”
  3. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc.

    339 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 180 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding sufficient evidence to support finding that there was “some connection” between two parties jointly performing method claim
  4. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 149 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight
  5. In re Rouffet

    149 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 160 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that objective evidence of nonobviousness [secondary considerations] "includes copying, long felt but unsolved need, failure of others, commercial success, unexpected results created by the claimed invention, unexpected properties of the claimed invention, licenses showing industry respect for the invention, and skepticism of skilled artisans before the invention"
  6. Callaway Golf v. Acushnet Co.

    576 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 116 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding verdict irreconcilably inconsistent where jury found dependent claim obvious and found independent claim nonobvious
  7. In re Sang-Su Lee

    277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 106 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that agency tribunals "must make findings of relevant facts, and present its reasoning in sufficient detail that the court may conduct meaningful review of the agency action"
  8. In re Oelrich

    666 F.2d 578 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 93 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Stating that "[t]he mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient" to establish inherency (quoting Hansgirg v. Kemmer , 102 F.2d 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939) )
  9. In re Fritch

    972 F.2d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 32 times
    Stating "dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious"
  10. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,166 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  11. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  12. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  13. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)