Ex Parte Bechtel et al

10 Cited authorities

  1. Phillips v. AWH Corp.

    415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 5,828 times   167 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "because extrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the district court in its sound discretion to admit and use such evidence"
  2. Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc.

    381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 1,935 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the claims are not "presumed" to be restricted to the embodiments disclosed in the specification
  3. In re Am. Academy of Science Tech Ctr.

    367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 88 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that descriptions of deficiencies of using mainframe computers set out in the "Background of the Invention" portion of the specification did not exclude mainframes from the definition of "'user computer'" where the "specification as a whole" did not express a clear disavowal of that subject matter
  4. Application of Swinehart

    439 F.2d 210 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 42 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the term "transparent" was definite because the disclosure, which showed that a substantial amount of infrared radiation was always transmitted even though the precise degree of transparency varied depending on certain factors, was sufficiently clear
  5. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 28 times
    Affirming § 103 rejection when § 102 rejection would also have been appropriate
  6. Application of Best

    562 F.2d 1252 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 18 times   4 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark

  7. Application of Ludtke

    441 F.2d 660 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 13 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8513. May 6, 1971. John O. Tresansky, Washington, D.C., attorney of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Edward E. Kubasiewicz, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and SKELTON, Judge, Customs Court, sitting by designation. ALMOND, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals, adhered to on reconsideration, affirming the rejection of claims 1-7 of appellants'

  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)