Ex Parte Barreiro Garcia

16 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,523 times   180 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 142 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight
  3. Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc.

    587 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 115 times   12 Legal Analyses
    Holding that “an analysis of obviousness ... may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person of ordinary skill [which] do[es] not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion”
  4. Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp.

    112 F.3d 495 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 136 times
    Holding that in construing the count, the court "must look at the language as a whole and consider the grammatical structure and syntax"
  5. Randall Mfg. v. Rea

    733 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013)   Cited 81 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Reversing finding of non-obviousness where court “narrowly focus[ed] on the four prior-art references” and ignored record evidence of “the knowledge and perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art” to explain motivation to combine or modify references
  6. Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp.

    732 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2013)   Cited 61 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that 18-month sunset period was not an abuse of discretion
  7. In re Etter

    756 F.2d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 121 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting that whether one prior art reference can be incorporated into another is "basically irrelevant."
  8. In re Icon Health

    496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 46 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that "[a]nalogous art to Icon's application," which related to "a treadmill with a folding mechanism and a means for retaining that mechanism in the folded position," included "any area describing hinges, springs, latches, counterweights, or other similar mechanisms—such as the folding bed in" the prior art
  9. Estee Lauder Inc. v. L'Oreal

    129 F.3d 588 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 59 times
    Holding that reduction to practice does not occur until inventor knows embodiment will work for its intended purposes
  10. In re Cree, Inc.

    818 F.3d 694 (Fed. Cir. 2016)   Cited 24 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "self-serving statements from researchers about their own work do not have the same reliability"
  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,065 times   462 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 183 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)