§

Ex Parte Barber et al

09903444 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 21, 2013)
Ex Parte Barber et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,575 times   189 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Pfizer v. Apotex

    480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 383 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court clearly erred when it failed to consider relevant prior art

  3. Superguide Corp. v. Directv Enterprises

    358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 308 times   12 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a party "waived its right to assert a construction other than 'matches or equals' for the term 'meet'" because it agreed to that construction in its briefs

  4. In re Ngai

    367 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 15 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting that allowing claims where the printed matter was the only novel contribution would allow "anyone [to] continue patenting a product indefinitely provided that they add a new instruction sheet to the product"

  5. In re Eli Lilly & Co.

    902 F.2d 943 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that an unexpected result in increasing the efficiency of feed utilization in ruminant animals was not sufficient when it was expected that the combination would increase weight gain in animals, as the prior art had invited experimentation in this area

  6. Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Manbeck

    959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 13 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "cases involving `public rights' may constitutionally be adjudicated by legislative courts and administrative agencies without implicating the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial"

  7. Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Manbeck

    751 F. Supp. 225 (D.D.C. 1990)   Cited 7 times

    Civ. A. No. 88-3656-OG. November 14, 1990. Raymond G. Hasley, Michael Kushnick, Rose, Schmidt, Hasley DiSalle (E. Wallace Breisch, of counsel), Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff. Fred E. McKelvey, Sol., Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol., United States Patent and Trademark Office, Washington, D.C., for defendant. OPINION BENNETT, Senior Circuit Judge.[fn*] [fn*] Marion T. Bennett, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. 28 U.S.C. § 291(b) (1988)

  8. Application of Mageli

    470 F.2d 1380 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 12 times
    Rejecting the "close case" argument, noting that the Graham decision "provided new guidance" in the area of, inter alia, secondary considerations

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  12. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)