Ex Parte Aulick

10 Cited authorities

  1. Jones v. Hardy

    727 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 122 times
    In Jones, this court reversed the district court's conclusion of obviousness because probative facts were not in dispute, no credibility determinations needed to be made, and the litigation had been going on for ten years.
  2. In re Gordon

    733 F.2d 900 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 31 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding that a modification which renders the invention inoperable for its intended purpose is not obvious because it teaches away from the invention
  3. In re Fracalossi

    681 F.2d 792 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 21 times
    Addressing whether specific anticipation rejection was sufficient evidentiary support for obviousness rejection
  4. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 29 times
    Concluding a compound was undisputedly taught in the prior art and then determining that additional limitations that merely "set forth the intended use for, or a property inherent in, an otherwise old composition . . . do not differentiate the claimed composition from those known to the prior art"
  5. In re Mills

    916 F.2d 680 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 8 times

    No. 90-1184. October 9, 1990. James C. Wray, McLean, Va., argued for appellant. Muriel E. Crawford, Asst. Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With her on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Inferences. Before MAYER and LOURIE, Circuit Judges, and MILLER, Senior Circuit Judge. LOURIE, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from the November 2, 1989, decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

  6. Application of Warner

    379 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1967)   Cited 22 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 7822. June 29, 1967. Richard E. Warner, for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. SMITH, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of the appealed claims under 35 U

  7. In re Ruff

    256 F.2d 590 (C.C.P.A. 1958)   Cited 19 times

    Patent Appeal No. 6357. June 24, 1958. Brumbaugh, Free, Graves Donohue, New York City (Eben M. Graves and John R. Janes, New York City, of counsel), for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (J. Schimmel, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. C. Willard Hayes, Washington, D.C., William J. Barnes, New York City, Neal A. Waldrop, Detroit, Mich., Leland L. Chapman, Cleveland, Ohio (Paul L. Tillson, Pittsburgh, Pa., John D. Upham and Frederick C. Wellington, Dayton, Ohio

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,174 times   493 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  9. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,034 times   1029 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  10. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)