Ex Parte Arita et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. In re Geisler

    116 F.3d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 52 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding a 26 percent improvement in wear resistance insufficient to constitute proof of "substantially improved results"
  2. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness
  3. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant
  4. In re Chu

    66 F.3d 292 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 31 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a reference was properly considered prior art because the earlier filed application did not support the patent's claims, thereby precluding reliance on its earlier priority date
  5. Gardner v. TEC Systems, Inc.

    725 F.2d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that dependent claims fall with the independent claim on which they depend unless argued separately
  6. Application of Kuhle

    526 F.2d 553 (C.C.P.A. 1975)   Cited 7 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 75-602. December 4, 1975. Keith D. Beecher, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant. Joseph E. Nakamura, Sol., R.V. Lupo, Assoc. Sol., Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office affirming the examiner's rejection of claims 5 and 6 of application serial No. 314,180, filed Dec. 11, 1972, for "Portable Moisture

  7. Application of Rice

    341 F.2d 309 (C.C.P.A. 1965)   Cited 2 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7253. February 18, 1965. William T. Sevald, Royal Oak, Mich., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges. MARTIN, Judge. The question the court must answer in this appeal is whether appellants' novel air cleaner, as represented by claims 1, 2 and 3 of their application serial No. 816,556 entitled "Air Cleaner" filed on May 28

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,133 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  9. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,003 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)