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Ex Parte Anwar et al

11061185 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 29, 2013)
Ex Parte Anwar et al

14 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,522 times   180 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek

    567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 259 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the first prong was not met when “the record developed in the infringement proceeding ..., show[ed] that the question of equivalence was a close one,” particularly in light of the intensely factual inquiry involved in the doctrine of equivalents analysis

  3. Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.

    399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 88 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding that a single prior use invalidates both system and method claims

  4. In re Gurley

    27 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 100 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Upholding obviousness finding where patent was directed to one of two alternative resins disclosed in prior art reference, even though reference described claimed resin as "inferior."

  5. In re Baxter Travenol Labs

    952 F.2d 388 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 94 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Evaluating teaching of prior art at the time of disclosure

  6. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 23 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant

  7. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 43 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"

  8. In re Lowry

    32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that printed matter doctrine did not apply to sequences of bits stored in memory because the claims dictated how application programs manage information, not the information content of the memory

  9. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 28 times
    Affirming § 103 rejection when § 102 rejection would also have been appropriate

  10. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,061 times   459 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  11. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,941 times   958 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)