§

Ex Parte Alms et al

10943527 - (D) (B.P.A.I. Mar. 26, 2009)
Ex Parte Alms et al

13 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,574 times   189 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Muniauction v. Thomson Corp.

    532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 247 times   62 Legal Analyses
    Holding it obvious to “apply the use of the Internet to existing electronic processes at a time when doing so was commonplace.”

  3. U.S. v. Ryles

    988 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1993)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that trooper placing his head inside a vehicle or opening a vehicle's door was not an unreasonable search because the trooper had just discovered that the driver was unlicensed and possibly intoxicated and was trying to determine whether one of the vehicle's passenger could drive the vehicle

  4. Application of Prater

    415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969)   Cited 78 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation during examination "since the applicant may then amend his claims"

  5. In re Thorpe

    777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 40 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that prior art pertinent only to product is proper ground for rejecting product-by-process claims

  6. U.S. v. Gaston-Brito

    64 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1995)   Cited 26 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that alleged ex parte communication by a government agent with the jurors was presumptively prejudicial and required the court to “conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine whether the communication was harmless”

  7. Hartman v. Nicholson

    483 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 10 times

    No. 2006-7303. April 5, 2007. Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, William P. Greene, Jr., Chief Judge. Susan Paczak, Abes Baumann, P.C., of Pittsburgh, PA, argued for claimant-appellant. Martin F. Hockey, Jr., Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for the respondent-appellee. With him on the brief were, Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, and David M. Cohen, Director

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,031 times   1028 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  10. Section 145 - Civil action to obtain patent

    35 U.S.C. § 145   Cited 508 times   136 Legal Analyses
    Granting 60 days within which to file for District Court review of the PTO's decision

  11. Section 141 - Appeal to Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

    35 U.S.C. § 141   Cited 460 times   91 Legal Analyses
    Imposing no such requirement

  12. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  13. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)