Ex Parte Alary et al

10 Cited authorities

  1. In re Am. Academy of Science Tech Ctr.

    367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 88 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that descriptions of deficiencies of using mainframe computers set out in the "Background of the Invention" portion of the specification did not exclude mainframes from the definition of "'user computer'" where the "specification as a whole" did not express a clear disavowal of that subject matter
  2. In re Gurley

    27 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 102 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Upholding obviousness finding where patent was directed to one of two alternative resins disclosed in prior art reference, even though reference described claimed resin as "inferior."
  3. In re Peterson

    315 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 67 times   14 Legal Analyses
    Holding that any overlap between a claimed range and one in the prior art is sufficient for a prima facie case of obviousness, even if insufficient to render it unpatentable
  4. Toledo Co. v. Standard Parts

    307 U.S. 350 (1939)   Cited 120 times
    In Toledo Pressed Steel Co. v. Standard Parts, 307 U.S. 350, 355, 356, 59 S.Ct. 897, 899, 83 L.Ed. 1334, the court said: "The torch body was old in the art to which it belonged.
  5. Süd-Chemie, Inc. v. Multisorb Technologies, Inc.

    554 F.3d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 16 times
    Affirming finding that reference disclosed "uncoated" film where it did not describe the film as coated and did not suggest necessity of coatings
  6. Application of Wright

    569 F.2d 1124 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 27 times

    Patent Appeal No. 76-677. March 31, 1977. Joseph T. Eisele, John Kurucz, Kane, Dalsimer, Kane, Sullivan Kurucz, New York City, attorneys of record for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of Counsel. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of United States Patent Office. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and MILLER, Judges, and HERBERT N. MALETZ, Associate Judge, United States Customs Court. MILLER, Judge. This appeal

  7. Application of Bulina

    362 F.2d 555 (C.C.P.A. 1966)   Cited 5 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7559. June 23, 1966. H.M. Snyder, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before RICH, Acting Chief Judge, and MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Chief Judge WORLEY, pursuant to provisions of Section 294(d), Title 28, United

  8. Application of Allen

    51 C.C.P.A. 809 (C.C.P.A. 1963)   Cited 6 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7016. December 12, 1963. Ellsworth H. Mosher, Stevens, Davis, Miller Mosher, Washington, D.C., Richard W. Sternberg, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges. SMITH, Judge. The issue in the present appeal requires a determination of whether the differences between the cited prior art and the invention disclosed

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,133 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  10. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)