energy.me, LLC

12 Cited authorities

Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names
302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002) Cited 1,149 times
Holding that district court erred in granting summary judgment without discovery where the "nonmoving party's objections before the district court served as the functional equivalent of an affidavit" under Rule 56(d) and "the nonmoving party was not lax in pursuing discovery"
Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc.
202 F.3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000) Cited 66 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that we may affirm a district court's grant of summary judgment on any basis in the record
In re Bayer
488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2007) Cited 40 times 2 Legal Analyses
Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark
In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP
373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004) Cited 30 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that courts "may weigh the individual components of the mark" to assess its overall distinctiveness
In re Steelbuilding.com
415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 26 times 2 Legal Analyses
Affirming the refusal of the Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark STEELBUILDING.COM, because the mark was descriptive of online services for the design of steel buildings, and lacked secondary meaning
In re Chamber of Commerce of the United States
675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 8 times 2 Legal Analyses
No. 2011–1330. 2012-04-3 In re The CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES of America. William M. Merone, Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Edward T. Colbert. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Of counsel was Thomas V. Shaw, Associate Solicitor
Smith v. Network Sols., Inc.
135 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (N.D. Ala. 2001) Cited 15 times
In Smith, the court considered a claim that the defendant, VeriSign's predecessor-in-interest, maintained an unlawful monopoly by failing expeditiously to release newly expired domain names for re-registration. 135 F.Supp.2d at 1166-67.
Application of Abcor Development Corp.
588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978) Cited 36 times 2 Legal Analyses
In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co.
703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Cited 20 times 2 Legal Analyses
In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.
In re Gyulay
820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 14 times 1 Legal Analyses
Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,610 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

energy.me, LLC

12 Cited authorities

Holding that district court erred in granting summary judgment without discovery where the "nonmoving party's objections before the district court served as the functional equivalent of an affidavit" under Rule 56(d) and "the nonmoving party was not lax in pursuing discovery"

Holding that we may affirm a district court's grant of summary judgment on any basis in the record

Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark

Holding that courts "may weigh the individual components of the mark" to assess its overall distinctiveness

Affirming the refusal of the Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark STEELBUILDING.COM, because the mark was descriptive of online services for the design of steel buildings, and lacked secondary meaning

In Smith, the court considered a claim that the defendant, VeriSign's predecessor-in-interest, maintained an unlawful monopoly by failing expeditiously to release newly expired domain names for re-registration. 135 F.Supp.2d at 1166-67.

In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).

In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.

Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"