572 U.S. 118 (2014) Cited 3,122 times 74 Legal Analyses
Holding that the respondent could not "obtain relief" under § 1125 "without evidence of injury proximately caused by [the petitioner's] alleged misrepresentations"
Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"
Affirming TTAB's finding that the mark STONE LION CAPITAL was similar to the marks LION CAPITAL and LION, finding that little weight should be accorded to the addition of "Stone" because it did not distinguish the marks in the context of the parties' services
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Cited 96,628 times 95 Legal Analyses
Finding that, per N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1024, New York law provides a more forgiving principle for relation back in the context of naming John Doe defendants described with particularity in the complaint
15 U.S.C. § 1126 Cited 185 times 29 Legal Analyses
Stating that an application under § 44 "must state the applicant's bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce, but use in commerce shall not be required prior to registration"