356 U.S. 342 (1958) Cited 296 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding employer's insistence on a ballot clause was an unfair labor practice under § 8 because it was a non-mandatory subject of bargaining and it "substantially modifies the collective-bargaining system provided for in the statute by weakening the independence of the 'representative' chosen by the employees. It enables the employer, in effect, to deal with its employees rather than with their statutory representative."
In Houchens, for example, the union initially told the employer that "any contract proposal or recommendation would be subject to approval by the employees."
In F. W. Means Co. v. N.L.R.B., 377 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1967), this court held that although the technical rules comprising contract law do not necessarily control all decisions in labor-management cases, the normal rules of offer and acceptance are generally determinative of the existence of a collective bargaining agreement.
Rejecting a broad order and stating, "An order restraining Company interference `in any like or related manner' with employees' organizational rights will protect the Company from the possibility of contempt proceedings if in the future it commits some new violation unlike and unrelated to the violation now found."
Holding that failure to receive letter does not raise presumption that letter was not mailed, and in any event such evidence is irrelevant when policy calls only for mailing
In Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 7 Cir., 213 F.2d 374, 376, the Court held that if the strike vote clause in that case was included within the statutory subjects of bargaining the employer was permitted to insist upon its position with respect thereto, provided the bargaining was conducted in good faith, but if it was not included within the statutory subjects of bargaining it could not be insisted upon by the employer to the point of creating an impasse in the negotiations.