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Duck Head Apparel Company, Inc. v. Domestic Industries, Inc.

No. 91105122 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 20, 1999)
Duck Head Apparel Company, Inc. v. Domestic Industries, Inc.

5 Cited authorities

  1. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 190 times   32 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

  2. Kangol Ltd. v. Kangaroos U.S.A., Inc.

    974 F.2d 161 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 11 times

    No. 92-1059. August 31, 1992. James M. Wetzel, Chicago, Ill., argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Joanne M. Dennison, Chicago, Ill. Paul M. Denk, St. Louis, Mo., argued for appellee. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before RICH, NEWMAN, and RADER, Circuit Judges. RICH, Circuit Judge. Kangol Limited (Kangol) appeals from the August 21, 1991, decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) sustaining KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc.'s (Kangaroos) Opposition No. 80,228. Kangaroos

  3. King Candy Co. v. Eunice King's Kitchen

    496 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 8 times

    Patent Appeal No. 9245. June 6, 1974. J. Timothy Hobbs, Washington, D.C. (Mason, Fenwick Lawrence, Washington, D.C.), attorney of record, for appellant. William B. Mason, Arlington, Va. (Mason, Mason Albright, Arlington, Va.), attorney of record, for appellee. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 178 USPQ 121 (1973)

  4. Rule 15 - Amended and Supplemental Pleadings

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 15   Cited 94,288 times   92 Legal Analyses
    Finding that, per N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1024, New York law provides a more forgiving principle for relation back in the context of naming John Doe defendants described with particularity in the complaint

  5. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"