Dr Pepper/ Seven Up, Inc. v. Krush Global Limited

12 Cited authorities

  1. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 191 times   33 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  2. Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin

    396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 73 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
  3. In re Nat. Data Corp.

    753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 73 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"
  4. In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc.

    105 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that DELTA is the dominant portion of the mark THE DELTA CAFÉ where the disclaimed word CAFÉ is descriptive of applicant's restaurant services
  5. In re Coors Brewing Co.

    343 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 15 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that beer and restaurant services are not sufficiently related to support a finding of a likelihood of confusion
  6. Octocom Systems v. Houston Computer Services

    918 F.2d 937 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 28 times

    No. 90-1196. November 2, 1990. Brian M. Dingman, Law Offices of Joseph S. Iandiorio, Waltham, Mass., argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Joseph S. Iandiorio. J. Paul Williamson, Arnold, White Durkee, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before NIES, Chief Judge, ARCHER and CLEVENGER, Circuit Judges. NIES, Chief Judge. Octocom Systems, Inc. (OSI), appeals from the final decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark

  7. In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.

    315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 13 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion
  8. Action Temporary Services v. Labor Force

    870 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Cited 10 times

    No. 88-1446. March 23, 1989. J. Rodman Steele, Steele, Gould Fried, Philadelphia, Pa., argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Gregory A. Nelson. Jonathan E. Jobe, Jr., Hubbard, Thurman, Turner Tucker, Dallas, Tex., argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Molly Buck Richard. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before RICH, SMITH and NEWMAN, Circuit Judges. EDWARD S. SMITH, Circuit Judge. In this concurrent use proceeding, the

  9. Paula Payne Prod. Co. v. Johnson Publishing

    473 F.2d 901 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 16 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8876. March 1, 1973. Edward G. Fenwick, Jr., Washington, D.C., Mason, Fenwick Lawrence, Washington, D.C., attorneys of record, for appellant. Leonard S. Knox, Chicago, Ill., attorney of record, for appellee. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. LANE, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, abstracted at 166 USPQ 512 (1970), dismissing an opposition lodged

  10. San Fernando Electric Mfg. Co. v. JFD Electronics Components Corp.

    565 F.2d 683 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 11 times

    Appeal No. 77-576. November 23, 1977. Rober C. Comstock, Los Angeles, Cal., of record, for appellant. Edward A. Meilman, Ostrolenk, Faber, Gerb Soffen, New York City, of record, for appellee; Sidney G. Faber, New York City, of counsel. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Associate Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) dismissing an

  11. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 24 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"