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Down Girls Up, LLC and Starcycle Franchise, LLC v. CB IP, LLC

92063406 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 20, 2019)
Down Girls Up, LLC and Starcycle Franchise, LLC v. CB IP, LLC

38 Cited authorities

  1. Harris v. Rivera

    454 U.S. 339 (1981)   Cited 466 times
    Holding that "[i]nconsistency in a verdict is not a sufficient reason for setting it aside" in a federal habeas corpus proceeding

  2. Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC

    668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 104 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

  3. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 188 times   30 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

  4. Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin

    396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 72 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"

  5. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.

    222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 72 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

  6. Recot, Inc. v. Becton

    214 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration

  7. Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC

    794 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015)   Cited 28 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"

  8. Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice

    710 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 86 times
    Holding that the shared term GIANT is the dominant portion of the marks, which supports a finding that there would be a likelihood of confusion between them

  9. Herbko Intern., Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.

    308 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 45 times
    Explaining that proprietary rights are necessary to show priority of use when petitioning for cancellation under section 2(d)

  10. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group

    637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 27 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Considering "corporate studies tracking awareness of the CITIBANK mark"

  11. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,585 times   272 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

  12. Section 1057 - Certificates of registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1057   Cited 1,027 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark

  13. Section 1058 - Duration, affidavits and fees

    15 U.S.C. § 1058   Cited 240 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Providing a ten-year duration for registered marks

  14. Section 2.52 - Types of drawings and format for drawings

    37 C.F.R. § 2.52   Cited 29 times
    Providing rules for applicants “who seek to register words, letters, numbers, or any combination thereof without claim to any particular font style, size, or color”

  15. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"