Doctors on Liens, Inc.

16 Cited authorities

  1. Thomas Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp.

    65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1995)   Cited 85 times
    Holding that "Copying is only evidence of secondary meaning if the defendant's intent in copying is to confuse consumers and pass off his product as the plaintiff's. In that situation, the defendant's belief that plaintiff's trade dress has acquired secondary meaning — so that his copying will indeed facilitate his passing off — is some evidence that the trade dress actually has acquired secondary meaning."
  2. Duopross Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd.

    695 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 23 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"
  3. In re Steelbuilding.com

    415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 26 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Affirming the refusal of the Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark STEELBUILDING.COM, because the mark was descriptive of online services for the design of steel buildings, and lacked secondary meaning
  4. In re Nett Designs, Inc.

    236 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 28 times
    Finding that prior registrations of marks including the term ULTIMATE "do not conclusively rebut the Board's finding that ULTIMATE is descriptive in the context of this mark"
  5. Yamaha Intern. Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co.

    840 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 46 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding secondary meaning for shape of guitar head always appearing in advertising and promotional literature
  6. In re Chamber of Commerce of the United States

    675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 8 times   2 Legal Analyses

    No. 2011–1330. 2012-04-3 In re The CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES of America. William M. Merone, Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Edward T. Colbert. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Of counsel was Thomas V. Shaw, Associate Solicitor

  7. In re Stereotaxis, Inc.

    429 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 7 times
    Affirming TTAB's finding that STEREOTAXIS was descriptive of certain magnetic medical devices and services because it described their functions and purposes—performing the “stereotaxis” brain surgery technique
  8. Application of Abcor Development Corp.

    588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978)   Cited 36 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
  9. In re Gyulay

    820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive
  10. In re Bongrain Intern

    894 F.2d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 10 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 89-1536. January 23, 1990. Thomas E. Young, Body, Vickers Daniels, Cleveland, Ohio, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Robert V. Vickers. Albin F. Drost, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., of Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before NEWMAN and MAYER Circuit Judges, and DUMBAULL Senior District Judge. The Honorable Edward Dumbauld, Senior

  11. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,585 times   271 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  12. Section 1064 - Cancellation of registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1064   Cited 888 times   48 Legal Analyses
    Allowing a petition to cancel a certification mark if the registered owner "discriminately refuses to certify" qualifying goods or services
  13. Section 2.41 - Proof of distinctiveness under section 2(f)

    37 C.F.R. § 2.41   Cited 11 times   4 Legal Analyses

    (a)For a trademark or service mark - (1)Ownership of prior registration(s). In appropriate cases, ownership of one or more active prior registrations on the Principal Register or under the Trademark Act of 1905 of the same mark may be accepted as prima facie evidence of distinctiveness if the goods or services are sufficiently similar to the goods or services in the application; however, further evidence may be required. (2)Five years substantially exclusive and continuous use in commerce. In appropriate