Denise Roberts, Complainant, v. Ray Mabus, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

13 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 242,766 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 221,929 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (2000) Cited 21,641 times 22 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,515 times 98 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,433 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,285 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters
438 U.S. 567 (1978) Cited 2,187 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context
Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
896 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1990) Cited 2,011 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that one opposing summary judgment cannot rely simply on "conclusory allegations" or "unsupported speculation"
NIX v. WLCY RADIO/RAHALL COMMUNICATIONS
738 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1984) Cited 922 times
Holding an employee may be fired "for good reason, bad reason, reason based on erroneous facts, or no reason at all, so long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason"
Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp.
846 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1988) Cited 413 times
Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer

Denise Roberts, Complainant, v. Ray Mabus, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

13 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding that a "trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context

Holding that one opposing summary judgment cannot rely simply on "conclusory allegations" or "unsupported speculation"

Holding an employee may be fired "for good reason, bad reason, reason based on erroneous facts, or no reason at all, so long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason"

Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer