439 U.S. 322 (1979) Cited 4,324 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that district courts have discretion to refuse to apply offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel against a defendant if such an application of the doctrine would be unfair
Finding that letters indicating an intent to file a claim in the future for an unspecified amount were not claims as defined by the contract where the contractual definition of claim was substantially the same as the FAR definition: "a written demand or assertion by one of the parties seeking, as a legal right, the payment of money, adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief, arising under or relating to this contract"
Concluding that the same cause of action can exist in two cases only where the same set of transactional facts are involved in those cases and that, where the transactional facts differ, the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
Finding that promotional use of a mark on “incidental products” like whiskey, pens, watches, sunglasses, and food did not constitute use of mark for cigarettes
Holding that petition for cancelation of trademark that had been awarded through default judgment was precluded because the petition's effect was to collaterally attack a judgment in an infringement action
Explaining that owner's "enter[ing] into discussions" with third party about selling products bearing the mark could support an intent to resume use, even where no agreement resulted