Dana Kelman v. Mindee K. Hardin DBA Nose Better

21 Cited authorities

Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC
668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 109 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 194 times 33 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 76 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
Recot, Inc. v. Becton
214 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 57 times
Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration
In re Cordua Rests., Inc.
823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016) Cited 30 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that certain words referring to key aspects of a genus of services were generic for those services
Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP
746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014) Cited 26 times
Affirming TTAB's finding that the mark STONE LION CAPITAL was similar to the marks LION CAPITAL and LION, finding that little weight should be accorded to the addition of "Stone" because it did not distinguish the marks in the context of the parties' services
In re Viterra Inc.
671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 27 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
Crash Dummy v. Mattel
601 F.3d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 2010) Cited 28 times 3 Legal Analyses
Explaining that owner's "enter[ing] into discussions" with third party about selling products bearing the mark could support an intent to resume use, even where no agreement resulted
Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co.
753 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2014) Cited 16 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that appellant demonstrated entitlement to a "statutory cause of action" under the Lanham Act
In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.
315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003) Cited 13 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,922 times 127 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,616 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 1057 - Certificates of registration
15 U.S.C. § 1057 Cited 1,056 times 5 Legal Analyses
Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark
Section 1058 - Duration, affidavits and fees
15 U.S.C. § 1058 Cited 245 times 25 Legal Analyses
Providing a ten-year duration for registered marks
Section 1063 - Opposition to registration
15 U.S.C. § 1063 Cited 149 times 19 Legal Analyses
Identifying "dilution by blurring ... under section 1125(c) as a permissible grounds for opposition to a registration"
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 24 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

Dana Kelman v. Mindee K. Hardin DBA Nose Better

21 Cited authorities

Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration

Holding that certain words referring to key aspects of a genus of services were generic for those services

Affirming TTAB's finding that the mark STONE LION CAPITAL was similar to the marks LION CAPITAL and LION, finding that little weight should be accorded to the addition of "Stone" because it did not distinguish the marks in the context of the parties' services

Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"

Explaining that owner's "enter[ing] into discussions" with third party about selling products bearing the mark could support an intent to resume use, even where no agreement resulted

Holding that appellant demonstrated entitlement to a "statutory cause of action" under the Lanham Act

Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark

Providing a ten-year duration for registered marks

Identifying "dilution by blurring ... under section 1125(c) as a permissible grounds for opposition to a registration"

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"