CrossFit, Inc. v. Haeusler

21 Cited authorities

Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC
668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 108 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 190 times 32 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 72 times 4 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 73 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.
424 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 61 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding that attorney argument did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment
Recot, Inc. v. Becton
214 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 57 times
Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration
Ritchie v. Simpson
170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 48 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP
746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014) Cited 25 times
Reviewing the weight given to the similarity-of-the-marks factor for legal error
In re Viterra Inc.
671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 26 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
Kenner Parker Toys v. Rose Art Industries
963 F.2d 350 (Fed. Cir. 1992) Cited 51 times
Holding that in light of the appearance, sound and meaning of the marks PLAY-DOH and FUNDOUGH, consumers may receive the "same commercial impression" from the marks
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,873 times 126 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,597 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 23 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

CrossFit, Inc. v. Haeusler

21 Cited authorities

Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"

Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

Finding that attorney argument did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment

Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration

Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”

Reviewing the weight given to the similarity-of-the-marks factor for legal error

Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"

Holding that in light of the appearance, sound and meaning of the marks PLAY-DOH and FUNDOUGH, consumers may receive the "same commercial impression" from the marks

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"