§

Country Club Animal Hospital, Inc. v. Innopet Brands Corp.

No. 91106486 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2000)
Country Club Animal Hospital, Inc. v. Innopet Brands Corp.

13 Cited authorities

  1. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett

    477 U.S. 317 (1986)   Cited 221,900 times   41 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

  2. Sweats Fashions v. Pannill Knitting Co.

    833 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 163 times
    Finding that, on review of a grant of summary judgment in a USPTO opposition proceeding, "[opposer] would have us infer bad faith because of [registrant's] awareness of [opposer's] marks. However, an inference of 'bad faith' requires something more than mere knowledge of a prior similar mark. That is all the record here shows."

  3. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 190 times   33 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

  4. Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice

    710 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 88 times
    Holding that the shared term GIANT is the dominant portion of the marks, which supports a finding that there would be a likelihood of confusion between them

  5. Specialty Brands v. Coffee Bean Distributors

    748 F.2d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that "[w]hen an opposer's trademark is a strong, famous mark, it can never be of little consequence" in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis

  6. Opryland USA v. Great American Music Show

    970 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 24 times
    In Opryland, Opryland USA opposed the registration of "THE CAROLINA OPRY," arguing that the term was confusingly similar to Opryland's own marks.

  7. Lloyd's Food Products, Inc. v. Eli's, Inc.

    987 F.2d 766 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that third-party evidence should not be disregarded in evaluating the strength of a mark for purposes of determining the likelihood of confusion

  8. Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enterprises, Inc.

    951 F.2d 330 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 14 times
    Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”

  9. Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's, Inc.

    961 F.2d 200 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 12 times
    Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"

  10. In re Electrolyte Laboratories, Inc

    929 F.2d 645 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 11 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the Board cannot ignore the less dominant portion of a cited mark

  11. Rule 56 - Summary Judgment

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56   Cited 338,321 times   161 Legal Analyses
    Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit