Consejo Regulador del Tequila, A.C. v. Lucien G. Lallouz

28 Cited authorities

Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.
572 U.S. 118 (2014) Cited 3,117 times 74 Legal Analyses
Holding that the respondent could not "obtain relief" under § 1125 "without evidence of injury proximately caused by [the petitioner's] alleged misrepresentations"
Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC
668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 109 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 194 times 33 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
On-Line Careline, Inc. v. America Online
229 F.3d 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 78 times
Applying Recot in analyzing the similarity of services
Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC
794 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Cited 29 times 2 Legal Analyses
Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"
In re Viterra Inc.
671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 27 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
In re I.Am.Symbolic, LLC
866 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017) Cited 18 times
Finding that the similarity of the marks weighed heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion
In re Chippendales USA, Inc.
622 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010) Cited 23 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that whether the trade dress was "a common basic shape or design" was "inapplicable" because "there has been no showing that the [trade dress] is common generally"
Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U.
797 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Cited 17 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that the Board erred in giving little weight to evidence of registered third-party marks in actual use
Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC
978 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2020) Cited 10 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that Lexmark controls the statutory cause of action analysis under § 1064
Rule 15 - Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Cited 96,524 times 95 Legal Analyses
Finding that, per N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1024, New York law provides a more forgiving principle for relation back in the context of naming John Doe defendants described with particularity in the complaint
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,923 times 127 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,616 times 275 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 1057 - Certificates of registration
15 U.S.C. § 1057 Cited 1,057 times 5 Legal Analyses
Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark
Section 1063 - Opposition to registration
15 U.S.C. § 1063 Cited 149 times 19 Legal Analyses
Identifying "dilution by blurring ... under section 1125(c) as a permissible grounds for opposition to a registration"
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 24 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

Consejo Regulador del Tequila, A.C. v. Lucien G. Lallouz

28 Cited authorities

Holding that the respondent could not "obtain relief" under § 1125 "without evidence of injury proximately caused by [the petitioner's] alleged misrepresentations"

Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Applying Recot in analyzing the similarity of services

Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"

Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"

Finding that the similarity of the marks weighed heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion

Holding that whether the trade dress was "a common basic shape or design" was "inapplicable" because "there has been no showing that the [trade dress] is common generally"

Holding that the Board erred in giving little weight to evidence of registered third-party marks in actual use

Holding that Lexmark controls the statutory cause of action analysis under § 1064

Finding that, per N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1024, New York law provides a more forgiving principle for relation back in the context of naming John Doe defendants described with particularity in the complaint

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark

Identifying "dilution by blurring ... under section 1125(c) as a permissible grounds for opposition to a registration"

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"