Complainant, v. Robert McDonald, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

8 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 241,266 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 220,657 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White
548 U.S. 53 (2006) Cited 11,621 times 104 Legal Analyses
Holding that a jury could find a reassignment from a position with "an indication of prestige" to one involving less desirable responsibilities "would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee"
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,388 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,200 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Staub v. Proctor Hosp.
562 U.S. 411 (2011) Cited 1,393 times 42 Legal Analyses
Holding that a person who "did not intend to cause dismissal" cannot be deemed "responsible" for the dismissal, even if the dismissal was the "result" or "foreseeable consequence" of the person's actions
Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp.
846 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1988) Cited 413 times
Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer
Section 2000e-16 - Employment by Federal Government
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 Cited 5,026 times 20 Legal Analyses
Adopting provisions of § 2000e-5(f)-(k), including that "[e]ach United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter"

Complainant, v. Robert McDonald, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

8 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding that a jury could find a reassignment from a position with "an indication of prestige" to one involving less desirable responsibilities "would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee"

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that a person who "did not intend to cause dismissal" cannot be deemed "responsible" for the dismissal, even if the dismissal was the "result" or "foreseeable consequence" of the person's actions

Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer

Adopting provisions of § 2000e-5(f)-(k), including that "[e]ach United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter"