477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 240,826 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 220,285 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Holding that coworkers' "sex-laden and sexist talk and conduct," such as the singing of offensive lyrics, in the presence of the plaintiff, the workplace's only woman, constituted sex-based harassment
Holding that where a supervisor makes sexual overtures to employees of both genders, or where the conduct is equally offensive to male and female workers, the conduct may be actionable under state law, but it is not actionable as harassment under Title VII because men and women are accorded like treatment
Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer
Finding "that a reasonable person would perceive that the graffiti, remarks ["brown boy," "Julio," and Javior"], and other harassing conduct were based upon his race and ethnicity"
Holding that a requested transfer could be an adverse employment action because the plaintiff's co-workers “caused her reasonably to fear for her safety if she stayed”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 Cited 5,021 times 20 Legal Analyses
Adopting provisions of § 2000e-5(f)-(k), including that "[e]ach United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter"