Cocoon International Sales, LLC

27 Cited authorities

Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co.
220 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000) Cited 276 times
Holding that the marks in the case were so dissimilar as to outweigh all other factors
W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Gillette Co.
984 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1993) Cited 290 times
Holding that knowledge of an earlier mark, in the absence of additional evidence indicating an intent to promote confusion or exploit good will or reputation, does not constitute good faith
Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.
41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) Cited 199 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that predatory intent, although once treated as an independent element, is more appropriately considered as merely a factor relevant to the likelihood-of-dilution analysis
Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC
668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 109 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 193 times 33 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 73 times 4 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC
794 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Cited 29 times 2 Legal Analyses
Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"
Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP
746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014) Cited 26 times
Affirming TTAB's finding that the mark STONE LION CAPITAL was similar to the marks LION CAPITAL and LION, finding that little weight should be accorded to the addition of "Stone" because it did not distinguish the marks in the context of the parties' services
In re Nat. Data Corp.
753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985) Cited 73 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"
In re Viterra Inc.
671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 27 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,615 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Cocoon International Sales, LLC

27 Cited authorities

Holding that the marks in the case were so dissimilar as to outweigh all other factors

Holding that knowledge of an earlier mark, in the absence of additional evidence indicating an intent to promote confusion or exploit good will or reputation, does not constitute good faith

Holding that predatory intent, although once treated as an independent element, is more appropriately considered as merely a factor relevant to the likelihood-of-dilution analysis

Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"

Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"

Affirming TTAB's finding that the mark STONE LION CAPITAL was similar to the marks LION CAPITAL and LION, finding that little weight should be accorded to the addition of "Stone" because it did not distinguish the marks in the context of the parties' services

Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"

Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"