477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 223,195 times 42 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Finding that use of the phrase “Palmer's Cocoa Butter Formula” was not probative on the question of whether the phrase “Cocoa Butter Formula” had acquired secondary meaning
Concluding that the same cause of action can exist in two cases only where the same set of transactional facts are involved in those cases and that, where the transactional facts differ, the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply
Holding that in the administrative adjudication context, it is “rather fundamental” and is a “basic tenet of due process” that “the Government cannot, without violating due process, needlessly require a party to undergo the burdens of litigation” because “[t]he Government is not a ringmaster for whom individuals and corporations must jump through a hoop at their own expense each time it commands”
Stating that the term privity "is simply a shorthand way of saying that nonparty [i.e. , a party not named in a prior action] will be bound by the judgment in that action"