550 U.S. 398 (2007) Cited 1,545 times 185 Legal Analyses
Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
Holding that party opposing summary judgment must show either that movant has not established its entitlement to judgment on the undisputed facts or that material issues of fact require resolution by trial
Holding an inventor may define specific terms used to describe invention, but must do so "with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision" and, if done, must "'set out his uncommon definition in some manner within the patent disclosure' so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change" in meaning
Holding that objective evidence of nonobviousness [secondary considerations] "includes copying, long felt but unsolved need, failure of others, commercial success, unexpected results created by the claimed invention, unexpected properties of the claimed invention, licenses showing industry respect for the invention, and skepticism of skilled artisans before the invention"
Holding that "[w]hile the opinion testimony of a party having a direct interest in the pending litigation is less persuasive than opinion testimony by a disinterested party, it cannot be disregarded for that reason alone and may be relied upon when sufficiently convincing"
Recognizing that the Supreme Court set aside the rigid application of the TSM Test and ensured use of customary knowledge as an ingredient in that equation.