China Healthways Institute, Inc. v. Xiaoming Wang

14 Cited authorities

  1. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 194 times   33 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  2. Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin

    396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 73 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
  3. Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice

    710 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 89 times
    Holding that the shared term GIANT is the dominant portion of the marks, which supports a finding that there would be a likelihood of confusion between them
  4. Ritchie v. Simpson

    170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 48 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
  5. In re Nat. Data Corp.

    753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 74 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"
  6. Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina

    670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 58 times
    Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"
  7. Specialty Brands v. Coffee Bean Distributors

    748 F.2d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that "[w]hen an opposer's trademark is a strong, famous mark, it can never be of little consequence" in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis
  8. In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.

    315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 13 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion
  9. Jewelers Vigilance Comm. v. Ullenberg Corp.

    823 F.2d 490 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 24 times
    Finding a “real interest” in a mark's registration can be shown “without proprietary rights in the mark or without asserting that it has a right or has an interest in using the alleged mark”
  10. Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enterprises, Inc.

    951 F.2d 330 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 14 times
    Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”