Charlie K.,1 Complainant, v. Jenny R. Yang, Chair, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,2 Agency.

16 Cited authorities

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (2000) Cited 21,559 times 22 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose"
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White
548 U.S. 53 (2006) Cited 11,654 times 104 Legal Analyses
Holding that a jury could find a reassignment from a position with "an indication of prestige" to one involving less desirable responsibilities "would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,293 times 96 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.
510 U.S. 17 (1993) Cited 12,666 times 23 Legal Analyses
Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"
Faragher v. Boca Raton
524 U.S. 775 (1998) Cited 9,490 times 101 Legal Analyses
Holding that, to be actionable, the alleged conduct "must be extreme" and "the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing" are not enough
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,401 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,221 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth
524 U.S. 742 (1998) Cited 7,240 times 93 Legal Analyses
Holding that an employer is not liable for a hostile work environment created by one of its employees when "the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and . . . the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise"
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.
523 U.S. 75 (1998) Cited 5,303 times 50 Legal Analyses
Holding that "[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive . . . connotations"
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson
477 U.S. 57 (1986) Cited 6,601 times 18 Legal Analyses
Holding that sexual harassment may be actionable under Title VII as discrimination on the basis of sex if it is sufficiently severe and pervasive
Section 2000e-16 - Employment by Federal Government
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 Cited 5,032 times 20 Legal Analyses
Adopting provisions of § 2000e-5(f)-(k), including that "[e]ach United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter"

Charlie K.,1 Complainant, v. Jenny R. Yang, Chair, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,2 Agency.

16 Cited authorities

Holding that a "trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose"

Holding that a jury could find a reassignment from a position with "an indication of prestige" to one involving less desirable responsibilities "would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"

Holding that, to be actionable, the alleged conduct "must be extreme" and "the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing" are not enough

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that "[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive . . . connotations"

Holding that sexual harassment may be actionable under Title VII as discrimination on the basis of sex if it is sufficiently severe and pervasive

Adopting provisions of § 2000e-5(f)-(k), including that "[e]ach United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter"