Charles W. Heckman, Complainant, v. Dirk Kempthorne, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.

18 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 243,214 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 222,322 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (2000) Cited 21,668 times 22 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,600 times 98 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,448 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,306 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Govs. v. Aikens
460 U.S. 711 (1983) Cited 2,426 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that because "[t]here will seldom be `eyewitness' testimony to the employer's mental process," evidence of the employer's discriminatory attitude in general is relevant and admissible to prove discrimination
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters
438 U.S. 567 (1978) Cited 2,188 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank Tr.
487 U.S. 977 (1988) Cited 1,406 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that plaintiff has burden to show that a particular employment practice "caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group"
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
401 U.S. 424 (1971) Cited 2,782 times 35 Legal Analyses
Holding that § 703(h) does not protect use of testing requirements with a disparate impact on racial minorities where the tests were not shown to be related to job performance
Rule 56 - Summary Judgment
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Cited 339,042 times 162 Legal Analyses
Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit

Charles W. Heckman, Complainant, v. Dirk Kempthorne, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.

18 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding that a "trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that because "[t]here will seldom be `eyewitness' testimony to the employer's mental process," evidence of the employer's discriminatory attitude in general is relevant and admissible to prove discrimination

Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context

Holding that plaintiff has burden to show that a particular employment practice "caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group"

Holding that § 703(h) does not protect use of testing requirements with a disparate impact on racial minorities where the tests were not shown to be related to job performance

Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit