477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 223,148 times 42 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Finding that, on review of a grant of summary judgment in a USPTO opposition proceeding, "[opposer] would have us infer bad faith because of [registrant's] awareness of [opposer's] marks. However, an inference of 'bad faith' requires something more than mere knowledge of a prior similar mark. That is all the record here shows."
Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
Holding that in light of the appearance, sound and meaning of the marks PLAY-DOH and FUNDOUGH, consumers may receive the "same commercial impression" from the marks
Affirming denial of registration of "TMM" mark for software because: it was likely to be confused with a registered mark "TMS," also used for software; "[t]he marks sound alike and look alike; and "[t]he products are very similar and directly compete."
Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”