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Bernardus Rademaker

11631962 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2019)
Bernardus Rademaker

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,572 times   188 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Pfizer v. Apotex

    480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 382 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court clearly erred when it failed to consider relevant prior art

  3. Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc.

    392 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 136 times   12 Legal Analyses
    Noting that licenses "may constitute evidence of nonobviousness; however, only little weight can be attributed to such evidence if the patentee does not demonstrate a nexus between the merits of the invention and the licenses of record" (quoting In re GPAC Inc. , 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) )

  4. In re O'Farrell

    853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 168 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Finding patent obvious where the prior art provided a "reasonable expectation of success"

  5. In re Baxter Travenol Labs

    952 F.2d 388 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 96 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Evaluating teaching of prior art at the time of disclosure

  6. In re Longi

    759 F.2d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 107 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a patent application was properly rejected for obviousness-type double patenting where the prior art references indicated a reasonable expectation of success

  7. Application of Clinton

    527 F.2d 1226 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that "a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had sufficient motivation to combine" the separate steps

  8. Application of Prindle

    297 F.2d 251 (C.C.P.A. 1962)   Cited 2 times

    Patent Appeals No. 6714. January 12, 1962. Ely, Pearne Gordon, Albert L. Ely, Jr., Cleveland, Ohio, for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Raymond E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge O'CONNELL, pursuant to provisions of Section

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,169 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)