Benjamin Lon Hing. Yu et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 30, 2019

14332260 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 30, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/332,260 07/15/2014 Benjamin Lon Hing Yu BDPOP.006A2 8243
20995 7590 07/30/2019
KNOBBE MARTENS OLSON & BEAR LLP
2040 MAIN STREET
FOURTEENTH FLOOR
IRVINE, CA 92614
EXAMINER
GANESAN, SUNDHARA M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3784
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/30/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
efiling@knobbe.com
jayna.cartee@knobbe.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte BENJAMIN LON HING YU,
MOHAMMAD ALI NAQVI,
JONATHAN MICHAEL KINNICK, and
COREY ROBERT TRIPP
____________________

Appeal 2018-007838
Application 14/332,260
Technology Center 3700
____________________

Before JILL D. HILL, LEE L. STEPINA, and ARTHUR M. PESLAK,
Administrative Patent Judges.

PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Benjamin Lon Hing Yu et al. (“Appellants”) appeal under 35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–6, 8, 9, and 11–
18.1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 BadPopcorn, Inc., is the Applicant and is identified as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A system comprising:
an electronic data store configured to store workout data
indicating performance of each of a plurality of users with
respect to each of a plurality of workouts; and
a computing system comprising one or more hardware
computing devices executing specific computer-executable
instructions, said computing system in communication with the
electronic data store, and configured to at least:
retrieve, from the electronic data store, workout
information associated with a user of the plurality of users,
wherein the retrieved workout information indicates
performance of the user with respect to each of a first plurality
of workouts;
generate a plurality of scores for the user, wherein each of
the plurality of scores indicates a performance level of the user
with respect to at least one of an exercise or a fitness trait;
determine a number representing an overall fitness level
for the user based at least in part on the plurality of scores,
wherein the number is determined based at least in part on a first
score and a second score that are each associated with a different
fitness category;
identify at least two outlying scores among the plurality of
scores based at least in part on a comparison of the outlying
scores to the overall fitness level of scores for the user;
automatically determine a potential cause of each of the at
least two outlying scores based at least in part on a score type
associated with each of the at least two outlying scores, wherein
a first outlying score of the at least two outlying scores represents
a fitness strength, wherein a second outlying score of the at least
two outlying scores represents a fitness weakness; and
generate a user interface for presentation to the user based
at least in part on the automatic determination, wherein the user
interface includes at least (a) a first graphical representation of
the first outlying score having a first visual appearance
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representing that the first outlying score represents a fitness
strength, and (b) a second graphical representation of the second
outlying score having a second visual appearance representing
that the second outlying score represents a fitness weakness,
wherein the user interface further identifies the determined
potential cause of the fitness weakness.

REJECTION
The Examiner rejected claims 1–6, 8, 9, and 11–18under 35 U.S.C. §
101 as being directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.

ANALYSIS
Claims 1–6
Appellants argue claims 1–6 as a group. Appeal Br. 10–14, 22. We
select claim 1 as representative of the group and claims 2–6 stand or fall
with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner rejects claims 1–6 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 finding that
the claims are directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. See
Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 10–17. In particular, the Examiner finds that the
claimed system is “drawn to an idea standing alone such as an uninstantiated
concept, plan or scheme, a mental process that can be performed in the
human mind or by a human using a pen and paper.” Final Act. 2; Ans. 11.
The Examiner determines that the claims do not identify an inventive
concept to transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible
application, because the claims do not include additional elements that
amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. See Final Act. 3; Ans.
16–17.
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Appellants argue that the Examiner erred because the Examiner 1) did
not clearly identify the alleged abstract idea, 2) did not provide any citation
that supports that the claims are similar to prior abstract ideas, 3) describes
the claims at a high level of abstraction, and 4) has not established that the
claims are “directed to” an abstract idea. See App. Br. 10–12; see also
Reply Br. 2–4. Appellants assert that the claims are directed to significantly
more than an abstract idea because the Examiner appears to ignore
limitations and incorrectly categorizes limitations as “post-solution output.”
Id. at 12–14; see also Reply Br. 4–7. For the following reasons, we sustain
the rejection of claim 1.
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides, “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “‘[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas”’ are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
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in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). If the
claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice
and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to
determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to
‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].”’ Id.
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77 (alteration in original)). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019
Revised Guidance”). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the
claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
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(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance.
Step 2A, Prong One
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we begin our analysis by first
turning to Alice step one (Step 2A, Prong 1 of the 2019 Revised Guidance).
We agree with the Examiner that claim1 is patent ineligible because it
recites the abstract idea of processes or functions that can be performed in
the human mind or by a human using a pen and paper. See Final Act. 2;
Ans. 11. Claim 1 is similar to other claims determined by the Federal
Circuit to recite the abstract idea of a mental process. See e.g., CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“All of claim 3’s method steps can be performed in the human mind, or by
a human using a pen and paper. . . . Such a method that can be performed by
human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible
under § 101.”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138,
1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e continue to ‘treat[ ] analyzing information by
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steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms,
without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea
category.”’) (Citation omitted).
Claim 1, with italics added to emphasize the pertinent limitations,
recites:
1. A system comprising:
an electronic data store configured to store workout data
indicating performance of each of a plurality of users with respect to
each of a plurality of workouts; and
a computing system comprising one or more hardware
computing devices executing specific computer-executable
instructions, said computing system in communication with the
electronic data store, and configured to at least:
retrieve, from the electronic data store, workout information
associated with a user of the plurality of users, wherein the retrieved
workout information indicates performance of the user with respect to
each of a first plurality of workouts;
generate a plurality of scores for the user, wherein each of the
plurality of scores indicates a performance level of the user with
respect to at least one of an exercise or a fitness trait;
determine a number representing an overall fitness level for the
user based at least in part on the plurality of scores, wherein the
number is determined based at least in part on a first score and a
second score that are each associated with a different fitness
category;
identify at least two outlying scores among the plurality of
scores based at least in part on a comparison of the outlying scores to
the overall fitness level of scores for the user;
automatically determine a potential cause of each of the at least
two outlying scores based at least in part on a score type associated
with each of the at least two outlying scores, wherein a first outlying
score of the at least two outlying scores represents a fitness strength,
wherein a second outlying score of the at least two outlying scores
represents a fitness weakness; and
generate a user interface for presentation to the user based at
least in part on the automatic determination, wherein the user interface
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includes at least (a) a first graphical representation of the first outlying
score having a first visual appearance representing that the first
outlying score represents a fitness strength, and (b) a second graphical
representation of the second outlying score having a second visual
appearance representing that the second outlying score represents a
fitness weakness,
wherein the user interface further identifies the determined
potential cause of the fitness weakness.
Apart from the recited electronic data store, computing system and
user interface, all of the above italicized processes can be performed
mentally or with a pen and paper. That is, a gym operator could access or
generate written workout information, and from that information determine
fitness scores for a user, including an overall fitness score and deviations
from the overall fitness score. Using this information, the gym operator
could then identify causes for the deviations based on prior deviations of
other users. Notably, this latter step could be done by the gym operator
merely remembering similar deviations of other users or looking up records
of other users.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites a mental
processes which is an abstract idea. Each of the steps of retrieving data,
generating scores based on that data, determining a number based on the
scores, identifying outlying scores, and determining a cause for the outlying
scores can be performed in the human mind or with pencil and paper. See
2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 1 (Groupings of Abstract Ideas).
Because claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong Two.
Step 2A, Prong Two
We next consider whether the abstract idea is integrated into a
practical application, namely whether the claim applies, relies on, or uses the
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abstract idea in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the abstract
idea, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54–55. To this end, we (1) identify whether there are any additional recited
elements beyond the abstract idea, and (2) evaluate those elements
individually and collectively to determine whether they integrate the
exception into a practical application. See id.
As explained below, the “additional elements” of claim 1 beyond the
abstract idea, i.e., the electronic store, computing system, and user interface,
considered in the context of claim 1 as a whole, do not integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application.
Appellants contend that the Examiner states that the computing
system is “recited as performing generic computer functions routinely used
in computer applications,” but, does not identify “what these supposedly
generic computer functions are, let alone any basis provided for why they
are considered to be generic.” Appeal Br. 13. The Examiner, however,
correctly found that the only “additional elements” recited in Appellants’
claims merely implement the abstract idea on generic computing elements
(i.e., electronic data store; computing system, graphical user interface). See
Final Act. 3. We note that Appellants’ Specification discloses known
memory 130 and mass storage device 120 for storage of information (data).
Spec. ¶ 16. Similarly the Specification discloses that “[c]onventional
operating systems control and schedule computer processes for execution,
perform memory management, provide file system, networking, I/O
services, and provide a user interface, such as a graphical user interface
(‘GUI’), among other things,” and that the processes are “executed by a
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computing system that includes one or more general purpose computers or
processors.” Spec. ¶¶ 17, 54. As our reviewing court has observed, “after
Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations
does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.” DDR
Holdings, 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at
223). Appellants do not direct us to any evidence in the record that the
recited computer components are anything other than generic computer
limitations.
Appellants also contend that the limitation in claim 1 of presenting the
outlying scores “in a graphical representation within a user interface with
respective visual appearances,” is not post-solution output. Appeal Br. 14.
Appellants fail to explain persuasively how the recited graphical
representation of data is different from other insignificant extra-solution or
post-solution activity, such as data collecting, analyzing, and displaying.
See MPEP § 2106.05(g) “Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity.” Unlike
Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 840 F.3d 1343, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (cf. Appeal Br. 12) where the improvement was to a physical tracking
system, here “the focus of the claim[] is not to a physical-realm
improvement but an improvement in wholly abstract ideas–the selection and
mathematical analysis of information, followed by reporting or display of
the results.” SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed.
Cir. 2018. Appellants’ alleged improvement to the visual presentation lies in
the abstract idea itself, not to any technological improvement in the display
or the “efficiency of using the electronic device.” See Core Wireless
Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
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Appellants’ reliance on Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (see Appeal Br. 11–12) is also not persuasive because the
claimed invention does not improve the functionality or efficiency of a
computing device, or otherwise change the way the device functions, at least
in the sense contemplated by the Federal Circuit in Enfish. The claimed
self-referential table in Enfish was a specific type of data structure designed
to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory. Enfish,
822 F.3d at 1339. Claim 1, however, does not focus on improving
computers as tools, but rather is directed to an abstract idea that uses a
computer as a tool.
We, thus, determine that claim 1 does not recite additional elements
improving (1) the computer itself, or (2) another technology or technical
field. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)). Rather, when considering claim 1 as a whole, the above-
noted additional elements merely (1) apply the abstract idea on a computer;
(2) include instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer; or (3)
uses the computer as a tool to perform the abstract idea. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(f)).
For all of the reasons discussed above, claim 1 does not integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application and, thus is directed to the
recited abstract idea.
Step 2B
We now proceed to determine whether claim 1 provides an Inventive
Concept under Step 2B. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, only if a claim:
(1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into
a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific
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limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood,
routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.
We do not agree with Appellants’ contentions that “a computing
system configured to generate a plurality of scores … and automatically
determine a potential cause of each of the at least two outlying scores … are
not generic computer functions, nor are they routine or conventional.”
Reply Br. 7.
Using a computer to generate data and apply decision criteria to data
to generate a result, are some of the most basic functions of a computer. All
of these computer functions are well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry. See Inventor Holdings, LLC v.
Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding
that the claims therein involving a sequence of data retrieval, analysis,
modification, generation, display, and transmission were ineligible), Two-
Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329,
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding the claims therein involving a sequence of
processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring ineligible). In short, each
step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions.
Accordingly, Appellants have not shown error in the Examiner’s
finding that the computer limitations recited in claim 1 are “well-understood,
routine, and conventional” in the field. See MPEP § 2106.05(d).
Conclusion-Claims 1–6
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For all of the reasons discussed above, Appellants have not persuaded
us of error in the rejection of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claims 2–6 fall with
claim 1.
Claims 8, 9, 11, and 13–15
The Examiner rejects claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 finding that the
claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Final Act. 4. Claim 8 recites a computer-implemented method with
substantially similar limitations as claim 1. Appeal Br. 26–27 (Claims
App.). Appellants raise substantially the same arguments for claim 8 as for
claim 1. See Appeal Br. 14–18; Reply Br. 8.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8 under 35
U.S.C. §101 for the same reasons discussed above for claim 1. Appellants
do not argue separately for the patentability of claims 9, 11, and 13–15 (see
Appeal Br. 22), and these claims fall with claim 8.
Claim 12
Claim 12, which depends from claim 8, recites “wherein the potential
cause is determined based at least in part by applying a first electronically
retrieved rule set that identifies a cause based on a defined score relationship
between at least two types of exercises.” Appeal Br. 23 (Claims App.).
Appellants contend that this limitation amounts to significantly more than an
abstract idea because it recites more than a desired result. According to
Appellants, claim 12 “recites how that determination is made, in contrast to
court cases in which courts have found claims to be directed to an abstract
idea itself when the claims do not specify how a desired result is achieved.”
Id. (citing Internet Patents Corporation v. Active Network, Inc. (Case Nos.
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2014–1048, 2014–1061, 2014–1062 and 2014–1063; (Fed. Cir., June 23,
2015) (finding that a claim that recites a desired result and “contains no
restriction on how the result is accomplished” is directed to an abstract idea
itself)). Id. Appellants contend that, in addition, claim 12 is not directed to
an abstract idea because it does not merely recite “steps or aspects of
determining a potential cause of an outlying sub-score that would be
necessary or expected when . . . using a computer.” Id. Appellants assert
that the Examiner’s position that “applying a first electronically retrieved
rule set” is merely “information” departs from “the Federal Circuit’s
analysis of similar ‘rule set’ claim language in McRO. Reply Br. 9 (citing
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., No. 2015–1080 (Fed.
Cir. September 13, 2016). Appellants submit that the “application of a rule
set with specific characteristics in Claim 12 in the present application limits
the claim to a specific process that does not have preemption concerns, as
was the case in McRO.” Id. For the following reasons, we sustain the
rejection of claim 12.
Appellants do not persuasively explain how the additional limitations
of claim 12 remove claim 12 from the abstract idea of mental processes.
That is, claim 12 recites using a generic computer (the processes of claim 12
are “executed by a computing system that includes one or more general
purpose computers or processors.” Spec. ¶ 54) to retrieve a rule set that
identifies a cause based on a defined score relationship between at least two
types of exercises. The rule set could be set forth on paper and a human can
compare exercise results in their head based on the rule set to identify a
cause.
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Appellants’ reliance on Internet Patents Corporation is also not
persuasive because Appellants do not explain how determining a cause
based on particular data removes claim 12 from the realm of an abstract idea
of a mental process. See, e.g., Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network,
Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v.
Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014); and
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2011). See also SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Contrary to InvestPic’s suggestion, it does not matter to
this conclusion whether the information here is information about real
investments. As many cases make clear, even if a process of collecting and
analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular
‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than
abstract.”); Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266,
1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“tailoring of content based on information about the
user -- such as where the user lives or what time of day the user views the
content -- is an abstract idea that is as old as providing different newspaper
inserts for different neighborhoods”) (citing Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
Appellants’ reliance on McRO is also unavailing. There, the claimed
process used a combined order of specific rules that rendered information in
a specific format that was applied to create a sequence of synchronized,
animated characters. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315. Notably, the recited process
automatically animated characters using particular information and
techniques--an improvement over manual three-dimensional animation
techniques that was not directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 1316. But, unlike
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the claimed invention in McRO that improved how the physical display
operated to produce better quality images, the claimed invention here merely
uses generic computing components to access information and identify a
potential cause of an outlying score based on that information--a generic
computer implementation that is not only directed to fundamental data
access and analysis functions, but also does not improve a display
mechanism as was the case in McRO.
Appellants’ arguments do not persuade us error in the Examiner’s
determination that claim 12 is directed to the abstract idea of a mental
process as explained above in connection with claim 1, or that the additional
element of claim 12 integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application, or that any specific limitation in claim 12 beyond the judicial
exception is not “well-understood, routine, and conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)). Consequently, we sustain the rejection of claim
12.
Claims 16–18
The Examiner rejects claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 finding the
claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Final Act. 6. Claim 16 recites a computer-readable non-transitory storage
medium storing computer executable instructions with substantially similar
limitations as claim 1. Appeal Br. 28–29 (Claims App.). Appellants raise
substantially the same arguments for claim 16 as for claim 1. See Appeal
Br. 18–22; Reply Br. 8.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 16 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 for the same reasons discussed above in connection with
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claim 1. Appellants do not argue separately for the patentability of claims
17 and 18 (see Appeal Br. 22), and these claims fall with claim 16.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–6, 8, 9, and 11–18 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED