Finding that, on review of a grant of summary judgment in a USPTO opposition proceeding, "[opposer] would have us infer bad faith because of [registrant's] awareness of [opposer's] marks. However, an inference of 'bad faith' requires something more than mere knowledge of a prior similar mark. That is all the record here shows."
Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
Holding that the shared term GIANT is the dominant portion of the marks, which supports a finding that there would be a likelihood of confusion between them
Affirming TTAB's finding that the mark STONE LION CAPITAL was similar to the marks LION CAPITAL and LION, finding that little weight should be accorded to the addition of "Stone" because it did not distinguish the marks in the context of the parties' services
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
15 U.S.C. § 1126 Cited 185 times 29 Legal Analyses
Stating that an application under § 44 "must state the applicant's bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce, but use in commerce shall not be required prior to registration"
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"