Finding that, on review of a grant of summary judgment in a USPTO opposition proceeding, "[opposer] would have us infer bad faith because of [registrant's] awareness of [opposer's] marks. However, an inference of 'bad faith' requires something more than mere knowledge of a prior similar mark. That is all the record here shows."
Affirming the refusal of the Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark STEELBUILDING.COM, because the mark was descriptive of online services for the design of steel buildings, and lacked secondary meaning
Affirming TTAB's finding that STEREOTAXIS was descriptive of certain magnetic medical devices and services because it described their functions and purposes—performing the “stereotaxis” brain surgery technique
In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
Determining that "[g]rowth in sales" did not prove acquired distinctiveness where it "may indicate the popularity of the product itself rather than recognition of the mark"
In Levi Strauss Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1401, 222 U.S.P.Q. 939 (Fed. Cir. 1984), we affirmed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's refusal to register a mark for a shoe tab. Noting the significant prior use of such tabs by other companies, we held that "Levi's use of a tab on shoes has been neither first nor exclusive," thus, it failed to show that its mark was distinctive.